From: Aleksandr Mogylchenko <amogylchenko@mirantis.com>
Date: Wed, 13 May 2015 17:26:48 +0000 (-0700)
Subject: Update qemu package to mitigate CVE-2015-3456
X-Git-Url: https://review.fuel-infra.org/gitweb?p=packages%2Fcentos6%2Fqemu.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=ad92abb8034ec1689ddfa6669add8ece58711fa7

Update qemu package to mitigate CVE-2015-3456

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1218611

Change-Id: Ibf32a70495c9d0d7b2b09da5e89035d06cda369c
Closes-Bug: #1454795
---

diff --git a/0025-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-allocated-buffer.patch b/0025-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-allocated-buffer.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca78eac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/0025-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-allocated-buffer.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From ac7ddbe342d7aa2303c39ca731cc6229dbbd739b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 09:48:59 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] fdc: force the fifo access to be in bounds of the allocated buffer
+
+During processing of certain commands such as FD_CMD_READ_ID and
+FD_CMD_DRIVE_SPECIFICATION_COMMAND the fifo memory access could
+get out of bounds leading to memory corruption with values coming
+from the guest.
+
+Fix this by making sure that the index is always bounded by the
+allocated memory.
+
+This is CVE-2015-3456.
+
+Signed-off-by: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
+---
+ hw/block/fdc.c | 17 +++++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/hw/block/fdc.c b/hw/block/fdc.c
+index f72a392..d8a8edd 100644
+--- a/hw/block/fdc.c
++++ b/hw/block/fdc.c
+@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
+ {
+     FDrive *cur_drv;
+     uint32_t retval = 0;
+-    int pos;
++    uint32_t pos;
+ 
+     cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
+     fdctrl->dsr &= ~FD_DSR_PWRDOWN;
+@@ -1506,8 +1506,8 @@ static uint32_t fdctrl_read_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl)
+         return 0;
+     }
+     pos = fdctrl->data_pos;
++    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
+     if (fdctrl->msr & FD_MSR_NONDMA) {
+-        pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
+         if (pos == 0) {
+             if (fdctrl->data_pos != 0)
+                 if (!fdctrl_seek_to_next_sect(fdctrl, cur_drv)) {
+@@ -1852,10 +1852,13 @@ static void fdctrl_handle_option(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
+ static void fdctrl_handle_drive_specification_command(FDCtrl *fdctrl, int direction)
+ {
+     FDrive *cur_drv = get_cur_drv(fdctrl);
++    uint32_t pos;
+ 
+-    if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x80) {
++    pos = fdctrl->data_pos - 1;
++    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
++    if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x80) {
+         /* Command parameters done */
+-        if (fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos - 1] & 0x40) {
++        if (fdctrl->fifo[pos] & 0x40) {
+             fdctrl->fifo[0] = fdctrl->fifo[1];
+             fdctrl->fifo[2] = 0;
+             fdctrl->fifo[3] = 0;
+@@ -1955,7 +1958,7 @@ static uint8_t command_to_handler[256];
+ static void fdctrl_write_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl, uint32_t value)
+ {
+     FDrive *cur_drv;
+-    int pos;
++    uint32_t pos;
+ 
+     /* Reset mode */
+     if (!(fdctrl->dor & FD_DOR_nRESET)) {
+@@ -2004,7 +2007,9 @@ static void fdctrl_write_data(FDCtrl *fdctrl, uint32_t value)
+     }
+ 
+     FLOPPY_DPRINTF("%s: %02x\n", __func__, value);
+-    fdctrl->fifo[fdctrl->data_pos++] = value;
++    pos = fdctrl->data_pos++;
++    pos %= FD_SECTOR_LEN;
++    fdctrl->fifo[pos] = value;
+     if (fdctrl->data_pos == fdctrl->data_len) {
+         /* We now have all parameters
+          * and will be able to treat the command
+-- 
+2.1.0
+
diff --git a/qemu.spec b/qemu.spec
index ddbee04..8956116 100644
--- a/qemu.spec
+++ b/qemu.spec
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@
 Summary: QEMU is a FAST! processor emulator
 Name: qemu
 Version: 2.0.0
-Release: 4
+Release: 5
 Epoch: 2
 License: GPLv2+ and LGPLv2+ and BSD
 Group: Development/Tools
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ Patch0021: 0021-ssi-sd-fix-buffer-overrun-on-invalid-state-load.patch
 Patch0022: 0022-openpic-avoid-buffer-overrun-on-incoming-migration.patch
 Patch0023: 0023-virtio-net-out-of-bounds-buffer-write-on-load.patch
 Patch0024: 0024-virtio-validate-config_len-on-load.patch
+Patch0025: 0025-fdc-force-the-fifo-access-to-be-in-bounds-of-the-allocated-buffer.patch
 
 BuildRequires: SDL-devel
 BuildRequires: zlib-devel
@@ -768,7 +769,7 @@ CAC emulation development files.
 %patch0022 -p1
 %patch0023 -p1
 %patch0024 -p1
-
+%patch0025 -p1
 
 %build
 %if %{with kvmonly}
@@ -1548,6 +1549,9 @@ fi
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed May 13 2015 Aleksandr Mogylchenko <amogylchenko@mirantis.com> - 2:2.0.0-5
+- VENOM, or CVE-2015-3456;
+
 * Sun May 11 2014 Cole Robinson <crobinso@redhat.com> - 2:2.0.0-4
 - Migration CVEs: CVE-2014-0182 etc.